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CORRESPONDENCE Open Access
Let’s talk about standards: a commentary on
standards of practice in empirical bioethics
Alan Cribb
Abstract
This commentary welcomes the work of Ives et al. on Standards of practice in Empirical Bioethics, and especially
the dialogical spirit in which the standards have been constructed and offered. It also raises some questions about
the consistent interpretation and use of such standards.
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Main text
Surely most people are ambivalent about standards. We
wish to set and keep standards, of course, but we are
conscious that standards can go wrong in various ways,
for example: they can be badly calibrated, including by
being too vague or too narrowly defined; or they can
have unintended consequences such as by having op-
pressive effects when they are meant to be helpful. I may
wish to be respectful towards my parents but the very
act of being reminded of that standard can cause me to
fail.
The authors of “Standards of practice in Empirical Bio-
ethics research” [1] deserve many congratulations not
only for recognising that standard setting is a tricky
business but for conscientiously striving to keep their
balance whilst navigating these hazardous paths.
The whole work is presented as a staging post in a
move ‘towards’ consensus about standards. And the re-
sults are explicitly treated as both the consequence of
one process and the start of another one – they reflect
dialogue and debate amongst the 16 participants and
co-authors and they are being offered in order to initiate
a larger conversation. The resulting text wonderfully
holds together two sets of tensions between closing
things down and opening them up. It carefully articu-
lates the consensus statements whilst clarifying the dis-
agreements that had to be negotiated in the process of
formulating them. And it also embodies a respectful dia-
logue with the community of readers – “This specifies
where we got to. But what do you think?”
Because so much is going on in this richly woven text
it is impossible to respond adequately in a short com-
mentary. But I will just make some brief observations re-
lating to each of the two phases of dialogue – the
process of standard setting reported in the paper and the
anticipated phase of standard reception or use.
The first thing that becomes manifest on reading the
text is that finding a framing, and a language, for stan-
dards is far from straightforward. This is not surprising
given that the project of empirical bioethics centres
around, and depends upon, foundational debates about
the nature of knowledge and ethics. When the issues in
question are at this foundational level then every word
that is chosen can have different implications and reso-
nances for different people. This applies, not least, to the
central business of capturing what is going on when the
word ‘empirical’ is added to the word ‘bioethics’. Unless
we are happy to extend the label of ‘empirical bioethics’
to essentially descriptive work (and I will come back to
that idea) it seems uncontroversial to say that empirical
bioethics is a field in which the methods of empirical so-
cial sciences and a concern for what ought to be done
co-exist. However the reported discussion and disagree-
ments around, and the resultant and very measured
wording of, standards 2 and 4 show how difficult it is to
definitely say much more than this. These standards
(along with 5 and 6) refer to the business of ‘integration’.
Standard 2 talks about the integration of ‘empirical
methods’ and ‘ethical argument’; standard 4 sees integra-
tion as requiring an account of how ‘the empirical’ and
‘the normative’ are related. The commentary provided
makes it very clear that – even if we are merely seekingCorrespondence: alan.cribb@kcl.ac.uk
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to do justice to the participants in the consensus seeking
process - we should interpret the idea of ‘integration’ in
an elastic way. Specifically we are not being asked to
presume either that empirical and normative kinds of
inquiry can be seamlessly combined or that they repre-
sent two clearly distinct kinds of things in the first place.
Those who are unhappy with the latter presumption
may, as the authors note, be resistant to engaging with
the concept of integration, seeing it as “the construct of
an artificial philosophical separation”. In short, a word
that sits at the core of the standards - ‘integration’ – al-
beit quite explicitly allowing for “an expansive under-
standing of ‘integration’” – seems problematic, for
fundamental reasons, to some of the participants in the
consensus setting process. This raises questions about
how far such standards would be accepted, interpreted
and applied in consistent ways, especially when they are
dislodged from the narrative within which they are
presented.
The (unavoidable) foundational disputes are managed
by the authors – including in the formulation of the
standards themselves – with skill and subtlety. For ex-
ample, the standards require researchers simply to ar-
ticulate their broad epistemological/ meta-ethical
position but to explain and justify how this position is
translated into specific project methodology. This means
that researchers are not expected to try and persuade
their readers of the validity of their underlying philo-
sophical stance (although they will typically be signpost-
ing readers to currents of literature where that is
attempted) but they are expected to make that stance
sufficiently clear as part of enabling the reader to make
sense of, and assess the appropriateness and rigour of,
the specific conjunction of aims and methods set out. In
clarifying and defending these requirements the authors
explain that “it would be unreasonably burdensome to
expect researchers to defend all meta-ethical and epis-
temological commitments and assumptions in every
paper”.
I would like, as an aside, to briefly note the wisdom of
this remark about burdensomeness. I would guess that
many people who think of themselves as doing empirical
bioethics will not only be pleased not to have to con-
stantly “defend all meta-ethical and epistemological
commitments and assumptions” but will be cautious
about their capacity to defend them at all (if ‘defend’ im-
plies an effort that is sufficiently sophisticated to be a
credible candidate for success rather than simply one of
‘taking a stab’). The people I have in mind here are not
indifferent to the demands of philosophical ethics but,
rather, are mindful of just how onerous those demands
are.
Turning to the question about the potential reception
and use of the standards then what should we imagine
about who might make use of them, and when, where and
how? In opening up the conversation these are some of
the key questions the authors are raising for readers. The
authors have done a lot of work and much of the rest is
for other people to debate and fathom. I have already
raised a concern about the fundamental challenge of dif-
ferent users interpreting the standards in diverse ways.
But, leaving that aside, it is clear that there are a number
of other uncertainties and complications to address. I will
just flag up one practical uncertainty here – assuming we
were to agree standards for empirical bioethics research
(along the lines of the ones recommended here) then to
what research efforts and what fractions of efforts should
these standards be applied? The authors are sensitive to
the danger that the standards will be seen as drawing ter-
ritorial boundaries between ‘real’ empirical bioethics (as
defined by the standards) and other things calling them-
selves empirical bioethics. But, as they make clear, this is
inevitable given their project – a necessary part of specify-
ing standards for ‘x’ is specifying what is meant by ‘x’. The
paper explicitly lists four kinds of research that are not
covered by the standards but that, at least in some cases,
might be thought by some people to fall within a broader
notion of empirical bioethics. The upshot of this is that
different strands of research within a large research
programme, and sometimes with a single project, will fall
either side of this boundary. Even assuming that some re-
searchers accept the standards reported in this paper they
may find it more comfortable to refer to the whole
programme or project as work in ‘empirical bioethics’ (by
virtue of it containing some clear strand that fits the stan-
dards specification) rather than to disaggregate the
programme or project into parts. People have to find con-
venient summary labels for their work and although not
everything can be allowed to be assigned any label the
limits of what counts as defensible ‘packaging claims’ are
fuzzy. Perhaps more significantly the same applies if we
‘zoom in’ from programmes and projects to specific re-
search activities and products, and to elements of activities
and products (e.g. individual papers). Obviously not every
single research breath or every clause of every sentence
has to conform to whatever standards are agreed – this is
obviously a nonsense. Some notion of a suitably sized ‘unit
of research’ is entailed in the interpretation and applica-
tion of these standards and that may call for further
thought. This is not meant as an academic point but a
practical one – for example, when is it OK to publish pa-
pers that do not explain and justify project methodology if
such an account exists somewhere else? Given the notori-
ous challenges of juggling the demands of journals in
interdisciplinary fields some pragmatic flexibility in the
overt application of standards is no doubt needed.
This whole intervention is to be applauded. The au-
thors offer us some standards and invite us to a
Cribb BMC Medical Ethics  (2018) 19:69 Page 2 of 3
conversation – both these things seem welcome to me.
Time will tell how valuable the standards themselves are
but, I would suggest, the dialogical spirit of the invita-
tion is invaluable.
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